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In Thoughts on the Interpretation of Nature (1753), Denis Diderot discusses what may be the novelty of a 
science of becoming and morphogenesis, consequent with the autopoietic of nature. Far from arriving at a 
positivist conception, as is common among materialistic philosophies, the author projects a science of the 
probable, the contingent, the transitory, which requires the combined efforts of all capacities  of the 
knowing subject to carry out the ceaseless dialectic between the two poles of observation and 
interpretation. Imagination, intuition, prospect, and conjecture are summoned to accompany experiential 
activity, introducing an inventive dimension in science, whose freedom contributes to subverting the 
epistemological canon, blurring the rigidity of disciplinary boundaries, intensifying scientific discovery, and 
giving meaning to the cluster of research. Consequently, science becomes a plurality of texts , intersecting 
facts and conjectures, data and metaphors, protocol rigour and rhetorical procedures.  
The unusual character of this exuberance has led the main commentators on the work to presume that it is 
the fruit of philosophy’s intervention, to which it would be fitting to add the step of creativity, unfeasible in 
scientific methodology. In contrast, we argue that, for the philosopher, those various processes are 
constitutive of the same scientific research, which finds in judgment the central faculty and in abduction 
the privileged process of discovery.  
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As Mandosio (2013) rightly saw, the Thoughts on 
the Interpretation of Nature constitute “le discours 
de la méthode de Diderot”. There, the philosopher 
gives shape to what he sees as the ongoing 
scientific revolution, drawing in detail the 
epistemology of a science in accordance with the 
regulatory idea of a nature without determinant 
intelligence or conductive purpose, all formed by 
material, variable and self-productive processes in 
permanent evolutionary transformation. Faced 
with the difficulty in defending the need for a 
perennial state of the world, the new science 
becomes a function of conjectural interpretation. 
Its success depends less on observation data, 
always relative to a given instant and relying on 
interpretation than on the pertinence and 
coherence of the conjectures, destined to offer 
contexts of signification to the constitutive opacity 
of the former. 
It is what stems from how Diderot (1999, p. 71) 
establishes the hierarchy between the two 
attitudes that, not having to be produced by the 
same individual, form the general process of 
science:  
one of the main differences between the observer 
and the interpreter of nature is that the latter begins 
at the point where the former ceases to use his senses 
and his instruments; on the basis of what now exists, 
he speculates on what is to come; from the 
established order of things, he draws abstract and 
generalised conclusions which, for him, have all the 
force of particular, ascertainable truths. 
Consequently, if the observation appears 
indispensable to give epistemic consistency to the 
interpretation, it is up to the latter to guarantee the 
complex task of giving meaning to the scientific 
discovery. 
It is, thus, fit to recognise that the typical process of 
new science, what makes it progress, as Diderot 
sees it, is abduction, in other words, the search for 
the best explanation for a phenomenon that is 
always the controlled result of serendipity, “chance 
(which is never idle – and is more fruitful than 
man’s wit)” (Diderot, 1999, p. 63), even if all sorts 
of experiments and reasonings provoke that 
discovery. What makes a phenomenon 
epistemologically meaningful relies, precisely, on 
the random character of its discovery, without 
which it would be no more than an effect predicted 
by theory. In turn, it is the abductive reasoning that 
makes possible the construction of the 
epistemological access to a world of matter, 
moving progressively from the agreed theses – in a 
world view in which a double principle of matter 
and spirit predominates –, to a general framework 
in which material monism imposes itself as more 
keeping with the results of scientific research. If we 
consider, following Robin Smith, that, in the 
traditional Aristotelian sense, apagogè “involves 
leading the argument away from one question or 
problem to another because of taking something in 
addition” (Aristotle, 1989, p. 233), it becomes 
understandable to expect its protagonism as a 
gnoseological process. Diderot himself practices it 












at least since the «Letter to Paul Landois» 
(Bernardo, 2015, pp. 173-179). The term or its 
direct definition does not appear in the work, the 
same being true for others, like deduction and 
induction, probably because the philosopher seeks 
to avoid the conventionality of its use in logic, but 
what may correspond to them, from the 
epistemological point of view, seems sufficiently 
characterised in the aphorismatic sequencing. 
Thus, Diderot conceives abduction as an ample and 
complex gnoseological process, geared towards 
promoting scientific discovery, by combining 
structural components of the Aristotelian 
definition, and elements that anticipate the 
proposed interpretation, almost a century later, by 
Charles Peirce, at the Harvard conferences on 
pragmatism (1978, p. 172):  
Abduction is the process of forming an explanatory 
hypothesis. It is the only logical operation which 
introduces any new idea; for induction does nothing 
but determine a value, and deduction merely evolves 
the necessary consequences of a pure hypothesis.  
Likewise, Peirce’s assertion could be his, according 
to which “every single item of scientific theory 
which stands established today has been due to 
abduction” (1978, p. 172). Consequently, he takes 
over Stagirite’s idea of a sort of approximate 
reasoning, according to the degree of probability, 
which is justified:  
when it is clear that the first term belongs to the 
middle and unclear that the middle belongs to the 
third […]; or, next if the middles between the last term 
and the middle are few (Aristoteles, 1989, p. 100) 
However, confers it an amplitude and efficacy that 
lead him to relate it to a set of less conventional 
processes, equally identified by the American 
author: divination, breakthrough, instinct, 
discovery, inventiveness (Peirce, 1978, p. 173). In 
such an advance, what is discerned is not so much 
a genealogical link as the centrality that the 
eighteenth-century philosopher confers to the 
abductive exercise, in tune with a full realisation of 
its reach. 
Such does not mean that, for Diderot, as also latter 
for Peirce, the two other processes are not part of 
scientific research, quite on the contrary, given that 
the abduction, due to the freer context of the 
discovery, is marked by a constant tension between 
objectivity and meaning, truth and conviction. 
What occurs is a change in the way they are 
understood, both, henceforth, committed to the 
balance between experimentation and 
interpretation, geared to make nature speak, 
sometimes manipulating it intentionally, 
sometimes proposing its plan of action. 
In effect, the absence of a substantial perennial 
fund and the return of truth to the probability, 
make the idea of a necessary sequential reasoning 
unsustainable, one corresponding to the 
deduction. As Duflo summarizes (2013, p. 166):  
Les principes les plus généraux ne doivent pas nous 
servir pour déduire, mais pour chercher, et les 
hypothèses ne sont véritablement fécondes qu’à 
condition de féconder des expériences qui seules 
étendent véritablement le savoir. 
It is precisely the epistemological core of Diderot’s 
critique of the Methodists, particularly to Linnaean 
taxonomy, presented as the finished example of 
the abuse of deduction (Diderot, 1999, p. 64):  
Man, says Linnaeus in the preface to his Fauna 
Suecica, is neither a stone nor a plant; he must, 
therefore, be an animal. He does not have only one 
foot, so he cannot be a worm. He is not an insect 
because he has no antennae […] So what is man? He 
has a mouth like a quadruped. He has four feet; he 
uses the two fore-feet to touch with, and the two 
hind-feet to walk with. So he must be a quadruped. 
[…] ‘So your logic must be wrong’, the logician will say.  
In contrast, the deduction, put at the service of the 
interpretation of nature, becomes a reasoning by 
analogy, resulting from a comparative exercise on 
the similarities and differences between notions, 
explanations and theories, whose example is found 
in the ‘fifth conjectures’ about the molecular 
formation of bodies, within the framework of a 
theory of elasticity.  
Likewise, inductive reasoning loses its conventional 
abstractive reach, starting to correspond to an 
effort to find analogies among similarities or 
differences between the phenomena and facts 
resulting from several experiences, designed to 
highlight those relationships. Inductive work 
becomes, thus, one of the means of sustaining the 
adequate production of scientific conjectures, that 
may satisfy the double criterion of the maximum of 
possible probability and the maximum of possible 
reference relation. It stands halfway between 
singularity and generality, much more than mere 
collections of sparse data, but rather less than 
inferences allowing the establishment of a 
systematic legality or the founding of the exclusivity 
of one of those explanations. Consequently, the 
procedure from particular to the universal is 
reconducted to the horizontal and expansive logic 
of a network, while the cumulative process of data, 
personified by Reaumur’s entomology (Diderot, 
1999, p.70), ends up being questioned, replaced by 
a particular version of the eight operations of 
Bacon’s experimental method, where the 
requirement of variation and complexity of the 
experiments prevails (Diderot, 1999, p. 61) in a 
science aimed at following the seriality of nature. 
His critique is, in this case, directed against 
Reaumur’s monumental work on insects, as he asks 
(1999, pp. 69-70): 
What would posterity think of us, if all we had to leave 
behind was a complete entomology or a vast survey 












This position leads him to suggest even that, in the 
impossibility of fulfilling this experimental protocol, 
it is preferable to opt for experiences of thought 
whose script recreates it. The entire Letter to the 
Blind illustrates this option, offering a complete 
thinking experience, replacing the failure to be 
present at the surgical intervention of Cheldesen, 
considered insufficient to generate effective 
progress of knowledge. 
Serendipity, experimentation, deduction and 
induction are not the only procedures in which 
abduction relies on. The use of the productive 
imagination, aimed at suggesting images that give 
shape to the new perspectives, that make tangible 
the conjectured forms, that confer the due 
consistency to the foreseen processes, becomes, 
also, indispensable. Referring to D’Alembert’s 
Dream, Bourdin evidences this dynamic (1998, p. 
79):  
Imaginer, extrapoler, généraliser, tirer des 
conséquences, tout le Rêve est animé par des appels 
à prolonger les suggestions de l’imagination mise en 
contact avec des savoir positifs.  
Just like Diderot’s philosophy, the conception of 
science that he draws, finds in phantasy, 
simultaneously, the insertion of the most abstract 
levels of thought into physicality, and the scheme 
of translation of conjectural flashes into 
representations, whose figurative character 
ensures the system of equivalences with the 
material conditions of nature. However, regardless 
of how free it may seem, the use of the imagination 
is doubly delimited: on the one hand, imagination 
finds itself linked to the composition of partes extra 
partes, which guarantees the external reference; 
on the other hand, by taking place in the context of 
scientific discovery, its function becomes, ipso 
facto, defined by the intended objectives. It is not, 
therefore, a matter of weakening epistemic 
intentionality by introducing a fictional aspect, but 
rather of making it ben fit from the intrinsic 
translatability of cognitive faculties. In visually 
demonstrating, the scientist, while acquiring a 
superior accuracy over his mental representations, 
fully shares his vision with the community, 
favouring intersubjective modes of consensus, 
fundamental to a science of the probable.  
This justifies, likewise, the metaphorical use of 
images, recovered from cultural imagination or 
from the latest scientific imagery, namely from 
Chemistry (Pépin, 2014), put in operation in 
science’s signification regime. Bourdin reminds us 
that the three central images of D’Alembert’s 
Dream – the harpsichord, of La Mettrie, the swarm 
of bees, of Maupertuis and Bordeu, and the spider, 
of Chrysippus and Saint Paul – are not original 
(Bourdin, 1998, p. 97). Originality comes from how 
they are correlated with the issues under discussion 
– the sensitivity of matter, the consciousness of 
identity and the centrality of the brain. This play 
between resumed and reallocation results in a kind 
of saturation of the expressive potentialities of 
each procedure – the imaginary functioning as a 
true scheme of positivity, the understanding 
brought back to the plane of matrix analogies – 
should they be, as we proposed, constitutional, 
processual, metaphoric or direct (Bernardo, 2009, 
pp. 213-216) –, which contributes to illuminate the 
paths of inquiry. The result is neither pure 
metaphor, nor pure concept, but a “concept-
metaphor” (Ibrahim, 2010, p. 100).  
In either case, however, there is no place to 
encourage astonishment with a hypothetical 
teleological order, in the genesis of a vision 
marvelled at the prodigies of nature. Diderot, thus, 
remains faithful to “the principles of adequate 
conviction, set out in the article “Agnus scythicus” 
of the first volume of the Encyclopédie. Far from 
apologetically seeking to strengthen the motives 
for belief, this joint exercise of imagination and 
reflection aims to consolidate the reasonableness 
and positivity of knowledge. 
In such hybridity, made of science, philosophy and 
literature, but that Diderot rightly wants not as an 
amalgam, deviant of the reach of every single one, 
another process takes on the determining role. It is 
instinctive intuition, which Diderot (1999, p. 47) 
defines, with the help of a neologism [flair], as  
a propensity for divination, enabling them [scientists 
and practitioners] to ‘scent’, so to speak, unknown 
procedures, fresh experiments and hitherto-
undiscovered results. 
It is so, given that the inventiveness, that assists the 
interpreter of nature in the formulation of 
conjectural explanations, still requires a capacity to 
explore the meanings of experimental results, 
palpitation on the evolution of phenomena and 
projection of a unifying conjecture of the diverse 
phenomena. These cannot occur either from the 
pure exercise of reason, too distant from the 
physicality of natural processes nor the mere 
experimental observation, tied in the excessive 
familiarity with each case. 
To enter the functional logic of nature presupposes, 
rather, a paradoxical faculty, sufficiently attached 
to animality to convey the most elementary 
processes of nature, sufficiently intelligent to 
guarantee the translation of those intuitions to 
objectified forms of knowledge, that combines a 
natural spontaneity, a certain unconsciousness 
destined to facilitate risk-taking and power to 
combine diverse information. As Diderot writes 
(1999, p. 48): 
It is an irrational form of behaviour found to a 
surprising degree in those who have acquired, or who 
possess naturally, a gift for the experimental sciences.  
Inasmuch “dreams of this sort have led to a number 












this sort of guesswork which should be taught to 
learners” (1999, p. 48), more than “to introduce 
them to procedures and results” (1999, p. 47), 
given that it constitutes one of the more significant 
processes to help the passage from the status of 
observer to the one of interpreter of nature, not at 
the beginning of the research, where it would be a 
mere phantasy without foundation, but at a stage 
already sufficiently supported in factuality.  
This intuition is not, therefore, intellectual or 
noetic, does not stem from innate, a priori or 
preconceived ideas, but is “based on feeling, in the 
same way as men of taste judge works of the 
intellect” (Diderot, 1999, p. 47). Likewise, it is not 
about directly connecting a sensation to a psychic 
or mental representation, like in the imaginative 
apprehensions of Epicureanism (Gigandet, 2007, p. 
76), but of developing the potentialities of a device 
of our animality, by way of “the long-established 
habit of conducting experiments” (Diderot, 1999, p. 
47), in order to combine nature and culture.  
Diderot clearly marks this distance from the old 
conceptions of inventiveness and abduction, which 
assume an ontological character that is expressed 
in the presupposition of a stable gnoseological 
element – sensation, prolepsis, obvious major 
premise – when it replaces the classical definition 
of the process in question – “go from the known to 
the unknown” – with a formula that, parodying it, 
profoundly changes its structure – “the art of 
proceeding from the relatively unknown to the 
completely unknown” (Diderot, 1999, p. 48). 
Establishing the possible knowledge between two 
negative values, the author accentuates the 
dynamic character of science, always in 
constitution, there being no alfa, nor omega, from 
which to leave or arrive at. In such regime, what 
must be saturated is the process itself, making it 
benefit from the poetic-interpretative media with 
which, in other domains, the connection of ideas is 
promoted, the variants of segments of the world 
are suggested, and textualities are rehearsed, 
which, in being fictional, do not stop fulfilling the 
criteria of internal coherence, likelihood or 
pertinence, without abandoning the intentionality 
that guides scientific research.  
The context in which the aphorism arises that of the 
first conjectures about the spring constitutes in 
itself an excellent illustration of its scope. By 
subscribing to the contemporary debates on 
human reproduction, the series starts from a 
relatively unknown area, which the initial sentence 
– “There is a certain body know as a mola” (Diderot, 
1999, p. 48) – soon indicates. As the assumptions 
succeed one another, complying with the protocol 
of inquiry, on its generation, its constitution, its 
organisation or its behaviour, the spectrum of what 
is ignored thickens, making apparent the inversion 
of the proportionality between the already known 
and the yet unknown. The manifold conjectures 
that arise, therefore, appear as invested in that 
unknown land, combined effects of scientific 
rationality and creative imagination.  
When practised well, that blurring of disciplinary 
boundaries allows, likewise, the gaining of 
‘insights’, that lead to a profound rotation of the 
problems and suggest their eventual solution. 
D’Alembert’s Dream enacts such a possibility: 
amidst fantasies, daydreams, phantasmagorias and 
erotic dreams, the classic problem of vital 
animation, that led to the paroxysm of the 
substantive duality defended by Descartes, ends up 
converted into the one of animalisation, which 
confers explanatory plausibility to the hypothesis of 
life and thought as effects of the organisation of the 
same matter (Duflo, 2013, pp. 203-204). 
Thus, even if Diderot may characterize this scent 
with terms that refer to mystic enthusiasm or 
reverie – “a feeling of knowing what is about to 
happen which is akin to inspiration” (1999, p. 47) –
, he keeps it within the limits of the epistemological 
context, with the purpose of empowering 
judgement and hence to develop the exercise of 
conjectural reasoning. What characterises the use 
of enthusiasm in science is, effectively, its relation 
to abduction, how it contributes to the progress of 
scientific discovery, thanks to its power to raise the 
perception of the relations, the passages and the 
enchainment, in all the domains where it is 
exercised.  
Consequently, the judgements that originate from 
such practice cannot assume a dogmatic value, like 
the one that they hold in religious fervour, but 
assume the same conditional and conjectural form 
to which investigative science is obliged. Integrated 
into the abductive process, they cannot also assert 
a narrative self-referentiality. Instead, they must 
subject to the general process of falsification, which 
is an integral part of the logic of the abductive 
procedure. Similarly, the dispersion and the 
disarticulation of intuitions, that suggest an 
approximation to dreamlike irrationalism, in this 
‘extravagant’ use, that is, destined to foment the 
extension of scientific knowledge, become 
eloquent by being put in the service of the same 
conjectural textuality around analogies, previously 
identified in the course of the research, whose 
validity is assessed by its “relation to what precedes 
or follows it” (Diderot, 1999, p. 47).  
It is such subjection of creativity to the conditions 
of scientific practice that is indicated in this other 
definition (Diderot, 1999, p. 47):  
it is ‘a facility for supposing or perceiving contrasts or 
analogies which is rooted in a practical knowledge of 
the physical properties of subjects taken in isolation, 
or of their reciprocal effects when taken in 
combination’.  












constitutes, likewise, an epistemological 
procedure, integrating abductive labour, that 
benefits from the transposition of general schemes 
of inventiveness to attain the construction of a wise 
and useful knowledge, not despite its contingency 
or its capacity for subversion, but thanks to them. 
The new scientific research, as Diderot conceives it, 
arises, thus, as a permanent effort of discovery, 
interpretation and conjecture, based on analogical 
reasoning on data acquired in compliance with 
experimental protocols, on the invention of 
processes of experimentation designed to favour 
such a domain and on the gradual transposition of 
the information collected into acceptable 
explanatory sequences, a whole engineering that 
calls for a balance between creative freedom, the 
normative rigidity of the method and the learning 
capacity, up to the limit of resilience, which the 
work of Franklin or modern chemistry would 
symbolise (Diderot, 1999, p. 60):  
Open a book by Franklin; thumb through those 
written by chemists, and you will see how heavily the 
art of experimentation depends on opinions, 
imagination, sagacity and resources. 
Consequently, all the processes described are fully 
inscribed in scientific practice, not forcing the 
distribution of the order of knowledge between 
scientific method and curiosity (Ibrahim, 2010, p. 
94), nor lacking the extraordinary intervention of 
philosophy, whose task would be to take the step 
of freedom (Bourdin, 1998, p. 73) or to form the set 
of hypotheses that would make scientists think 
(Duflo, 2013, p. 241), even if they can benefit from 
visiting such repository, and everything points, in 
this conception, to the ideal of a philosophical 
science in interaction with a scientific philosophy. 
The key to their advance is found in that “aliance 
[…] entre la liberté imaginative et la légalité 
cognitive”, which Jean Petitot considered aesthetic 
in Kant (Petitot, 2004, p. 118), and that, as will be 
deduced from our exposition, seems 
epistemological for Diderot, as he defends (1999, p. 
39):  
The whole enterprise comes down to proceeding 
from the senses to reflection, and from reflection 
back to the senses: an endless process of withdrawing 
into oneself, and re-emerging. 
Most commentators have also mentioned, that 
Diderot’s epistemological paradigm is marked by 
the tension between this trial of a science that 
attempts to keep up with nature and the subjective 
conditions that make that intent possible. This 
tension, in fact, cannot but intensify with the 
progression of knowledge, given that the 
interpretation, becoming ever more necessary, 
requires an increased control of its connection to 
factuality. However, Diderot assumes an optimist 
position on this dynamism (1999, pp. 67-68):  
Are these conjectures borne out? The more 
experiments are performed, the more these 
conjectures are verified. Are the hypotheses valid? 
The wider the consequences range, the more truths 
they embrace, and the more compelling the evidence 
they provide. 
This trust originates in another master key of its 
epistemology: in seeking to calibrate science 
according to the possibilities of man, the 
philosopher identifies judgement as the true 
manager of all the processes involved in 
knowledge. At all the stages, the research appeals 
to the ability of judging, be it to select the data for 
observation, be it to choose the aspects that 
deserve the attention of the researcher, be it to 
identify the relations between the phenomena, be 
it to ponder the value of conjectures, be it to 
choose the best among them, be it, yet, to prefer 
one theory over another and, even, to weigh the 
arguments for a metaphysical conception like 
materialism, be it to determine the degree of 
inventiveness and of phantasy necessary to feed 
the intelligence.  
With his defence of the decisive role that the faculty 
of judgement must have in what he considers to be 
the new scientific paradigm, Diderot identifies 
probably the principle that allows the overcoming 
of one of the significant obstacles to science as an 
interpretation of nature, formed by the opposition 
between rationalism and empiricism. In fact, being 
fit to recognise that it is judgement that carries on 
the fundamental operations associated to the 
justification and validation of the results obtained, 
one must see in that understanding the expression 
of a perspective that is sufficiently innovative not to 
be, yet, banalised. Likewise, his perception of an 
episteme geared by discovery, that benefits from 
judicious cooperation between the conventional 
processes of scientific research and different modi 
operandi, usually attached to other spheres of 
cultural production, points to an epistemological 
alternative whose relevance has only recently 
begun to be evidenced. Could it have been his 
materialism that prevented him from continuing 
this intuition in a critical theory of the faculty of 
judging, and led him to prefer the development of 
a physiology of the faculties and of genius as found 
in D'Alembert's Dream? 
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